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This research aimed to identify and map the common patterns of human and 
organizational causes underlying two types of marine accident: groundings and 
collisions. Generalising patterns of causality from relatively unique and individual 
accident events required a structured and exploratory analytical approach. Two 
complementary human factor analysis tools were employed to analyse a set of 30 
detailed marine accident reports produced by the Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau. Common patterns of causality were identified for both groundings and 
collisions. Groundings commonly resulted from a failure to adequately plan a 
passage, coupled with either a problem locating the vessel, or communication 
problems on the bridge. Collisions often involved a fishing vessel and a bulk carrier 
or cargo vessel, and commonly resulted from both a problem identifying the 
existence or speed of the other vessel and, again, an inadequate planning process. 
Generalising these common causal patterns from a number of accidents identifies a 
range of points at which crews, managers and policymakers can intervene to forestall 
the development of these accidents. The method developed here may also be 
productively extended and applied to other accident types and used as an ongoing 
risk management tool.  
 
 
Human factors at sea: common patterns of error in 
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Introduction 
Understanding the human and organizational factors underlying major shipping 
accidents is a topic of key importance for maritime policy and management. 
Accidents at sea can cause severe harm, leading to loss of life, environmental damage 
and serious financial costs. As such, they are typically investigated extensively in 
order to learn from them and to improve risk management, both within individual 
companies and across the industry. Accident investigations often focus on the role of 
human error---the mistakes, unsafe acts or violations committed by crew members. 
Studies consistently estimate that around 80% of causes in marine accidents are 
attributable to human factors [1, 2]. Human error has traditionally been viewed as an 
individual cognitive, behavioural or sometimes moral issue, caused merely by 
carelessness or ignorance. Increasingly, however, there is a growing recognition of 
the influence of organizational context and situational factors in provoking and 
shaping errors. Situational factors such as inappropriate equipment or clumsy 
procedures can provide routine error traps for people to fall into. Likewise, 
organizational factors, such as production pressures or decisions that leave crew 
under-resourced, equally set the stage for poor performance [3]. As a leading scholar 
in this field, James Reason [4], has pithily observed, to understand and manage 
human error we need to focus less on the human condition and more on the 
conditions in which people work. 
Understanding the complex human, situational and organizational factors underlying 
past accidents is centrally important for improving safety and risk management in 
the industry. However, learning from past accidents is challenging. The sequences of 
events leading to an accident often appear unique and individual to each specific 
case. We therefore run the risk of drawing lessons that are equally specific and fail to 
generalise to other circumstances and situations---akin to standing around 
examining the stable door long after the horse has bolted. To learn from past 
accidents, we need to generalise from them, drawing systematic, general and widely 
applicable insights into their causes, and mapping causal patterns across several 
levels of analysis [5]. This article attempts this by examining two types of shipping 
accident---groundings and collisions---to identify the common patterns of human 
factor events that can cause them. To do this, 30 detailed marine accident 
investigation reports produced by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau are 
analysed using two complementary human factor analysis methods. Through this 
analysis, generalised accident scenarios are developed for both collisions and 
groundings, isolating the key causal patterns involved in each accident type. This 
article argues that producing these generalised accident scenarios provides important 
practical benefits. They can help crews recognise and control hazardous shipboard 
situations as they emerge. They can support company managers in analysing and 
addressing gaps in their internal risk management systems. And they can aid policy 
makers in identifying the most productive areas to target with regulatory 
interventions.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, some of the key ideas 
relating to the analysis of marine accidents and human factors are examined. Second, 
the methods developed to generalise marine accidents are detailed. Next, the findings 
of this research are presented and discussed, examining the common forms of error 
in groundings and collisions and how these are typically caused. Conclusions are then 
drawn concerning the implications and limitations of this approach to learning from 
accidents, the possibility of its wider application within the industry and directions 
for future research.  
 
Analysing errors and accidents 
Finding the appropriate level of analysis at which to understand major accidents has 
long been a key issue in discussions of risk and safety management [6]. These 
challenges apply equally to accidents in the maritime industry as much as any other. 
At one extreme, accidents appear to be idiosyncratic and one-off events, each 
concerning a unique set of problems that came together on the day in an entirely 
unpredictable and surprising way. At the other extreme, models of accidents can be 
so abstract as to be relatively imprecise and impractical, focusing on a small number 
of intangible concepts such as ‘complexity’ or ‘coupling’ within social-technical work 
systems [7]. Whilst analysis at each of these levels has its uses, a balance between the 
two has to be found to allow general lessons to be drawn that can guide practical 
management and policy responses. To this end, the most common and productive 
approaches to analysing accidents focus on mapping chains of causality leading up to 
the event. To analyse the role of human factors in accidents there are two distinct but 
complementary approaches in use---organizational error analysis and human 
reliability analysis. Both have been applied with useful results in the marine industry, 
and each underlies one of the two analytical tools used in the research presented 
here.   
 
Organizational error analysis 
Organizational error analysis has its roots in cognitive and ‘error’ psychology, and 
aims to analyse both the form and causes of unsafe acts and their relationship to 
safety defences and risk controls. Early analyses focused largely on identifying the 
form of common errors in marine accidents [8]. For instance, one human error 
analysis [9] found that 76% of human errors implicated in shipping accidents occur 
on the bridge. Stoop [10] examined a range of types of marine accidents, including 
groundings and collisions, in order to find common human and organizational 
factors involved. He found that the principle causes for both often involved 
inaccurate position finding, little or no use of navigation aids, poor communication 
on the bridge and inadequate preparation for the journey, including the absence of 
adequate or up to date charts.  
The scope of this approach to human factors was significantly broadened by Reason’s 
work on organizational error. Reason’s [4, 6] model explains how safety defences and 
barriers are breached by human factors. Defences may either take the form of ‘hard’, 
physical barriers guarding against hazards, or they may be ‘soft’, such as regulations 
or standard operating procedures. A basic assumption is that no defence is perfect, 
and when an error or unsafe act coincides with a defensive weakness, an accident 
may result. In this model, accidents are caused by both ‘active failures’ and ‘latent 
conditions’. Active failures are the unsafe acts committed by those working at the 
sharp-end---the crew. These unsafe acts are caused by both cognitive and situational 
factors, the latter of which are in turn directly shaped by broader organizational 
conditions. For instance, management decisions may result in the provision of 
inappropriate equipment, leading to the invention of a clumsy work-around solution 
making mistakes more likely. Latent conditions act directly upon safety defences. 
Shortcomings or poor decisions in the upper levels of organizations---such as 
implementing a deficient training regime---may leave gaps in defences.  
This approach to analysing human factors also makes an important distinction 
between errors and violations. Errors relate to some form of cognitive lapse resulting 
from, for instance, inattention, misperception or inadequate knowledge. Violations, 
on the other hand, involve actively deviating from prescribed procedures. As such, 
they involve a motivational aspect. Violations may be routine---whereby deviations 
are habitual---or erroneous, when the individual is unaware of the correct procedure. 
Both errors and violations have been extensively classified [4, 10]. However, as has 
been argued in other analyses of shipping accidents, more detailed frameworks are 
often of little use in practice due to the lack of detailed causal information that is 
required to apply them [11]. 
 
Human reliability analysis 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) has its roots in engineering risk analysis, and aims 
to quantitatively predict likely failure event sequences [12]. To analyse human factors 
in shipping accidents, error frequency databases and expert opinion have been used 
to predict reasons both for collision [13] and grounding [14]. Technica’s [13] analysis 
of collisions proposed the most likely scenario as that of the ‘errant vessel’, with 
inadequate watch keeping due to the bridge crew being distracted, incapacitated or 
incompetent. Amrozowicz’s [14] grounding analysis predicted powered groundings 
were the result of either a planning error---due to insufficient or incorrect 
information---or a detection or action error, whereby deviation from a safe track is 
either not detected or is incorrectly acted upon. Neither of these analyses went 
beyond these individual human errors to consider the likely underlying cognitive, 
situational or organizational factors. Admittedly, however, this was not their aim. 
Again, this HRA approach has recently been developed further. Hollnagel [15] 
developed a model that aims to account for the situational influences on human 
action and, specifically, error. The model uses local conditions and task-specific 
factors to categorise errors. So in this approach cognitive failures are traced back to 
their psychological and situational precursors, though relatively limited attention is 
paid to the broader organizational conditions involved.  
Organizational error analysis and HRA provide complementary approaches to 
analysing human factors and modelling accident causation. To date, both of these 
approaches are typically used to analyse the causal sequences underlying individual 
accidents, or to quantitatively summarise the frequency of errors in different types of 
accidents. This research, however, aims to apply these approaches to a set of shipping 
accidents in order to identify the typical patterns of organizational failure involved. 
That is, it aims to answer the question, what do the common causal patterns 
underlying a grounding and a collision typically look like?  
 
Methods: generalising marine accidents 
This research aimed to isolate the causal patterns underlying two types of marine 
accident: groundings and collisions. The aim was to pragmatically model how the 
typical causal patterns were structured across the levels of organizational conditions, 
situational and psychological factors, unsafe acts and defensive failures. Two 
complementary investigative tools were used to this end, each drawing on one of the 
two human factors analysis approaches discussed previously. Aspects of each of these 
analytical approaches were integrated to produce a framework within which 
Generalised Accident Scenarios (GAS) could be built (figure 1).  
 
Insert figure 1 about here. 
 
This analysis of common causal patterns aimed more for a heuristic, pragmatic 
model of causation than for any claims of comprehensiveness or precision. That is, 
the relationships between the different factors analysed did not represent 




A set of 30 Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) marine accident reports, 
produced between 1995 and 2000, were used for the analysis. 15 collisions and 15 
groundings were selected through stratified random sampling from the reports 
publicly available on the ATSB website. ATSB reports are well suited for re-analysis, 
given that they are all produced in a standard format, contain extensively detailed 
and non-judgemental analysis, and during this five year period were the product of 
similar investigation procedures.  
 
Analytical tools 
The two analytical tools employed to analyse the accident reports were the Cognitive 
Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) [15] and the Marine Accident 
Investigation Tool (MAIT: formerly RAIT, Railway Accident Investigation Tool) [16]. 
Each consists of an underlying model, classification scheme and methodology.  
 
Marine Accident Investigation Tool 
Originally developed for the railway industry, MAIT’s principles and classification are 
derived from Reason’s [4, 6] organizational error model, and therefore are highly 
transferable across domains. Beginning at the adverse outcome, MAIT traces the 
human factor elements along both latent and active pathways to ten root 
organizational conditions, called Marine Problem Factors (MPF), figure 2.  
 
Insert figure 2 about here. 
 
MAIT analysis provides a structured way to identify the defensive, individual and 
situational factors leading to an accident, and then assess the relative importance of 
each MPF for their occurrence. Analysis proceeds in six stages.  
i. The accident outcome is described: fatality, injury, damage or near miss. 
ii. Latent defensive weaknesses are identified and categorised according to the 
defensive mode and function they impact (figure 3). 
iii. Unsafe acts are identified and classified as errors, violations or erroneous 
violations. 
iv. The tasks associated with these unsafe acts are identified and detailed.  
v. Local contributing factors are isolated and classified as either personal or 
situational. 
vi. Finally, the relative contribution of each of the ten MPFs are evaluated, both 
in terms of their impact on defensive weaknesses (i.e. the latent pathway, 
from (ii)) and local factors (i.e. the active pathway, from (v)). Ratings are 
made on a scale of 0 (no contribution) to 4 (vary large contribution). The 
ratings are then summed for each MPF to give an active and latent failure 
profile.  
MAIT’s formal output is this MPF profile, highlighting the most important 
organizational failures for active and latent pathways. Further, in the course of the 
analysis, extensive qualitative data is generated detailing situational, defensive and 
error factors involved in each accident. 
 
Insert figure 3 about here. 
 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
CREAM analyses contextual influences on human action and was developed as a 
‘second generation’ HRA method [15]. It consists of an extensive and non-
hierarchical classification scheme and a formalised method specifying how to 
consequences and antecedents, to explore causal patterns.  
First, the model categorises broad ‘error modes’ (e.g. distance---too far; timing---to 
late). Causal antecedents of these errors are then classified within fourteen groups. 
For convenience here, these can be divided into person, technology and organization 
related causes (figure 4).  
 
Insert figure 4 about here. 
 
Within each group, antecedents are specified at two levels, the general and the 
specific. For instance, a general Permanent Person Related Function may be 
‘cognitive bias’, which can then be broken down into its specific form (e.g. ‘focus 
gambling’, ‘incorrect revision of probabilities’, ‘hindsight bias’, ‘attribution error’, 
‘illusion of control’, ‘confirmation bias’ and ‘hypothesis fixation’). 
Further, within the model, each antecedent has predetermined links to other general 
and specific antecedents. So, analysis proceeds by identifying the error mode then 
linking it to one of the general antecedents, at which point a more detailed 
categorisation can take place. Links to the next antecedent can then be followed in 
turn. A causal chain terminates when an antecedent cannot be broken down any 
further. The output of CREAM analyses takes the form of branching networks of 
consequent-antecedent chains, leading from each error mode.  
 
Procedure 
Each accident report was analysed with both of the tools in turn, producing a large 
corpus of data, both quantitative and qualitative. This data was then inductively 
explored to identify systematic causal patterns within each accident type. The MAIT 
output was analysed for common defensive, organizational and active failures. 
Defensive failure frequencies were summed by defensive mode for each accident 
type. The most important failure modes were then explored qualitatively in more 
detail. Common organizational conditions were examined via MAIT’s formal output, 
the MPF profile. Next, the qualitative data on situational and personal factors were 
grouped based on similarity within each accident type, and the most frequent factors 
were identified.  
For each accident type, the most frequent proximal (i.e. first level) antecedents 
isolated by CREAM were identified. The most common proximal antecedents for 
each type were then explored in more depth. The second level antecedents for each 
were recorded and an event tree produced, and compared within each type of 
accident. This identified the immediate human and situational antecedents for each 
accident type.  
Finally, the data produced from the above, supplemented by the qualitative 
information generated during the MAIT and CREAM analyses, was used to  construct 
a Generalised Accident Scenario for each accident type, by mapping the most 
common causal patterns and tracing the most likely links between the defensive 
failures and the organizational, situational and human factors involved.  
 
Results and discussion: common patterns of error 
Significant similarities were found in terms of the underlying causal factors for both 
groundings and collisions. Common patterns of error could be mapped for both 
accident types, capturing a large proportion of the observed causal factors involved. 
Groundings commonly resulted from a failure to adequately plan a passage, coupled 
with either a problem locating the vessel during the passage, or communication 
problems on the bridge. That is, if there was a problem with the planning of a 
passage, then the ship was more likely to succumb to some other disruptive event 
during the passage. The analysis of collisions conducted here focused on one sub-
type: collisions between trawlers and a bulk carrier or cargo vessel. These made up 
the majority of the accident reports that were sampled, and also posed a severe risk of 
loss of life for trawler crews. Bulk/cargo-trawler collisions commonly resulted from 
both a problem identifying the existence or speed of the other vessel and, again, an 
inadequate planning process. However, the planning failures were different on each 
type of vessel. Trawler crew typically failed in how they planned their watch. Bulk 
carrier or cargo vessel crew instead tended to plan an inadequate passing clearance. 
Common patterns of defensive failures, unsafe acts and situational and 
organizational precursors were associated with the key failure modes just described. 
These patterns, and the outputs from the analytical tools, are detailed in turn next, 




All the groundings analysed occurred during either approaching or leaving port via 
channel systems. In such a constrained performance environment, failures and 
triggering events were themselves constrained. There was little beyond the bridge 
team’s vigilance and awareness, and in particular the performance of the pilot, 
preventing grounding. Deficits in planning in combination with a communication or 
ship location problem were sufficient to cause a grounding.  
 
Human factor analysis  
The four major triggering factors isolated by CREAM were planning (30.3%), 
interpretation (18.2%), communication (15.2%) and team support (12.1%). These 
accounted for 75.8% of all proximal antecedents. The event trees showed that no 
single one was sufficient for grounding. A combination of planning and either one or 
two of the others was, however. One of these combinations provided sufficient cause 
in 53.3% of all cases of grounding.  
 
Planning errors 
Analysis of the CREAM data revealed that route planning failure divided into wrong 
(18.1%), absent (27.3%) or incomplete (54.6%) plans. Wrong plans were due almost 
exclusively to out of date or absent charts. Incomplete and absent plans regularly 
arose from cognitive bias, (often illusion of control, with an over-reliance on personal 
experience of the passage) and poor working conditions in the form of time pressures 
and heavy demand---a factor often highlighted in shipping safety [17]. Constructing a 
detailed and adequate plan of passage is the requirement of every pilot. As such, 
81.9% of planning failures (incomplete or no plan) resulted from a violation. These 
were attributed to both cognitive bias and time limitation. Pilots, familiar with their 
local channels, worked only to superficial plans. They were not deliberately taking 
risks, but were routinely---and presumably automatically [18]---running them. Pilots 
also often had little time to complete jobs. Anecdotal accounts in the reports suggest 
that these violations were routine due to the pressured and familiar nature of the 
task. The relatively infrequent occurrence of bad outcomes can allow these violations 
to persist---only 41 groundings were investigated by the ATSB from 1991 to 2001, yet 
pilots at busy ports can make this many passages in a week. 
 
Position finding errors 
Interpretation failures took two forms: decision errors  regarding the vessel’s heading 
(33.3%), and faulty diagnoses of vessel position or channel limits (66.6%). These 
were exclusively traced to individual factors of fatigue, insufficient knowledge---for 
instance, of vessel handling characteristics---or missing or confusing information. 
Fatigue accounted for 50% of MAIT situational factors, and misjudging the vessel’s 
location by the pilot made up 57.1% of the recorded errors. 
 
Communication errors 
Communication failures were entirely due to relevant information not being 
communicated. Team support failures arose due to a lack of team cohesiveness and 
an inadequate allocation of tasks---that is, bridge resource management (BRM) [19]. 
These failures resulted in crew members failing to conduct the appropriate checks 
and balances on each other’s actions. CREAM analysis determined these unsafe acts 
as due to inadequate knowledge of what it was necessary to communicate, and the 
lack of adequate procedures to explicitly specify such communications. This is likely 
to be exacerbated for temporary (i.e. non-crew) pilots, aboard for a short space of 
time to make the passage. Inadequate task allocation was on the whole due to under-
manning on the bridge. MAIT analysis revealed that 41.2% and 23.5% of situational 
factors in groundings were accounted for by poor communication and an 
undermanned bridge respectively.  
 
Defensive and 0rganizational factors 
MAIT analysis highlighted three important defensive failure modes; protection 
systems (33.3%), hazard identification and elimination (19.4%) and supervision 
(19.4%). Breaking these down further, 87.9% of protection system failures were due 
to no or poor planning of the passage---supporting the findings above. Just under 
one-half (48.5%) of hazard identification failures were due to out of date charts, 
whilst over a third (37.4%) were due to inadequate position plotting. 80.4% of 
supervision failures were due to an absent or inadequate briefing by the pilot 
regarding his proposed course.  
The grounding MPF profile (figure 5) highlighted important latent pathway factors as 
training (10.5%), planning (9.6%) and rules and policies (8.4%). Active pathway 
factors were training (10.7%), pressures (9.3%) and planning (9.2%). Further, an 
aggregate profile revealed communication (12.2%) as an important factor, spread 
fairly evenly between active and latent pathways. 
 
Insert figure 5 about here. 
 
Groundings: Generalised Accident Scenario  
The groundings analysed presented a coherent picture of the causal patterns 
involved. These could be brought together in a generalised grounding scenario (figure 
6). Grounding was often the product of poor passage planning, which breached 
regulatory defences, in coincidence with one or both of a hazard identification failure 
and supervisory deficit. Whilst planning failure had causes immediately localised in 
the individuals committing---or omitting---them, they could be reliably traced to 
more distal precursors and organizational factors.  
Wrong plans were due to mistakes. But these were dependent on inappropriate or 
less-than-adequate (LTA) information: vessels often had out of date, or no, charts for 
the channels they were using. Vessels are obliged to carry a set of charts detailing 
their proposed passage. However, routes were often altered ad hoc by charter 
companies once vessels had set sail. Further, requests by Masters to acquire charts at 
short notice were rarely supported by organizational structures. In two cases, for 
instance, company offices were shut for the weekend whilst Masters were contracted 
not to miss scheduled docking slots. So, inadequate information could be traced to 
poor organizational planning and deficient policies.  
Incomplete or absent planning is a violation. However, time pressures and Pilot’s 
familiarity with port approaches often rendered such violations necessary to meet 
deadlines, and were rarely perceived as risky. These factors can be traced to 
organizational pressures---in the form of recent deregulation and under-manning---
and inadequate training. To correct such habitual behaviour, extensive and 
prolonged training would be necessary [18]. 
Poor planning on its own was, however, not enough to lead to grounding. Such 
inadequacies can presumably be compensated for in forgiving circumstances. 
Planning failures were found in association with hazard identification and 
supervisory deficits. 
Hazard identification took the form of failures in correctly locating the vessel or 
channel. These  were due to misdiagnoses or erroneous decisions. Again, precursors 
can be traced to fatigue, poor charts and inadequate plotting of vessel position (i.e. 
information less than adequate). Personal fatigue was often the result of long work 
hours resulting from organizational pressures and poor planning of shifts. Chart 
problems have the same causal roots as outlined above; that is, poor organizational 
planning and pressures. Errors in position plotting per se were rare, but plotting was 
often irregular or not accurate enough. This was attributed to poor training and rules 
regarding the level of position plotting necessary in close-shore situations.  
Supervisory deficits were either communication or team support failures. These 
respectively resulted in information not being passed on, and disrupted cohesive 
BRM. Missing information was attributed to incomplete procedures for relaying 
details and a lack of knowledge regarding how and why this should be done. These 
precursors were therefore traced to rules, and training. Inadequate procedures and 
knowledge equally contributed to poor BRM, which was further compromised by 
under-manning, in turn due to organizational pressures. Further, both 
communication and BRM were often compromised by crews of various nationalities, 
with different native tongues. These crews had rarely received training to allow 
effective communication. 
Supervisory failures prevented harnessing the combined cognitive resources of the 
bridge team to their full. This allowed individual unsafe acts to pass unnoticed and 
uncorrected, reducing the safety margin in these distributed team activities. As such, 
communication problems may best be thought of as interacting with planning or 
hazard identification performance, rather than as a separate and isolated causal 
chain. 
 
Insert figure 6 about here. 
 
Collisions 
Of the collisions analysed, the majority (60%) involved incidents between a bulk 
carrier or cargo vessel and a trawler. 20% were collisions due to drifting off anchor, 
and 20% involved tug operations. First, it is worth briefly considering the latter two 
types of collision. Collisions by drifting off an anchorage were attributed to the crew 
on duty either not noticing ship movements, or noticing them but believing them to 
be instrument error without seeking corroborating evidence. These failures may be 
put down to the 86.5% peak for training on the drifting MPF profile. It could be 
argued that vessels should be obliged to anchor at greater distances from each other, 
so representing a policy failure. However, suitable anchorage grounds close to ports 
are not abundant, and the prescribed regulations allow good time to power the 
engines and correct the drift if an adequate watch is kept. Collisions between tugs and 
vessels they were assisting were due almost exclusively to temporary performance 
variability on the part of the tugmaster. Working in close quarters at low power, such 
collisions may be considered---to an extent---inevitable and relatively mild [20].  
Whilst the above two incident types did have causes reaching beyond the active 
failures briefly described, due to the prominence and potential severity of bulk/cargo-
trawler (B/C-T) collisions this type is focused on here. Further, the ATSB have 
highlighted these incidents as ones of great concern [21], and have suggested that 
unreported near-miss situations are even more common than the twenty one actual 
collisions investigated between 1991 and 2001 would suggest.  
 
Human factor analysis 
B/C-T collisions were due to inadequacies of planning or conducting watch keeping 
on both vessels. All occurred at night, whilst watch was kept by just one crew 
member. CREAM analysis identified three important triggering failures. These were 
inadequate planning (38.1%), inadequate observation (33.3%) and poor 
interpretation (19%), accounting for 90.4% of all proximal antecedents. These three 
main initiating factors were all individual cognitive failures. The event trees 
demonstrated that no single factor was sufficient in isolation. Planning in 
combination with observation or interpretation failures were sufficient triggers in 




The type of planning failure to occur on each of the two types of vessel involved in a 
B/C-T collision was consistently different, while observation and interpretation 
failures were common to both classes of vessel.  
On the trawlers, planning inadequacies took the form of either no watch, or an 
inadequate watch, being planned. On three occasions, small trawlers’ crews anchored 
their vessel and then all retired to bed. Alternatively, larger trawlers’ lookouts were 
often planned to include an untrained or inexperienced crew member---on one 
occasion, for instance, a Mate’s wife who had come along simply to cook the meals. 
Such small vessels also rarely had explicit procedures for keeping watch. Further, 
cognitive biases whereby the risk of a situation was not properly assessed were 
antecedent to just under one-half (44.4%) of the incorrect watch keeping plans 
aboard trawlers. All vessels are required to keep an adequate watch at all times, so 
the above constituted violations, and accounted for 57.1% of all the violations 
identified by MAIT. These violations were routine, arising from under-manning and 
the lack of adequately trained members in such small crews.  
Planning deficits on the bulk/cargo vessels took the form of inadequate clearance 
distances being planned when trawlers were being overtaken. Passing vessels are 
required to keep clear. As such, these poor plans too were violations. These were 
regularly attributed to one or both of two precursors. First, the watchman was 
inexperienced at judging and planning clearance distances at night. Second, the 
watchman was insensitive to the potential risk (30.8% of all MAIT personal factors) 
due to the forgiving open-sea conditions. As such, these violations were erroneous, as 
the perpetrator did not actively seek to infringe the regulations. 
 
Observation and interpretation errors 
Observation failures consisted solely of missed observations, that is, not noticing the 
other vessel. They were mainly due to the dark night-time conditions (100%), 
distraction by competing tasks (42.9%) and insufficient experience (28.6%). 
Interpretation failures all involved the faulty diagnosis of the other vessel’s speed or 
heading. These were due to the watchmen’s lack of knowledge regarding night time 
judgements (33.3%), ambiguous information from visual and electronic bearings 
(33.3%) and cognitive confirmation bias, where watchmen sought the minimum 
evidence to suggest the vessels were not on a collision course (33.3%). These findings 
were supported by MAIT analysis, which isolated inexperience at night watch as 
46.2% and over-reliance on one source of information as 23.1% of all personal 
factors. Further, 62.5% of errors identified by MAIT were those of poor and 
technologically unassisted judgements of the other vessel’s heading and speed. 
 
Defensive and organizational factors 
MAIT analysis isolated two defensive mode failures of importance: rules (43.8%) and 
hazard identification (31.2%). 42.8% of breaches of rule defences were by inadequate 
watch plans, whilst 28.6% were accounted for by incorrect passing clearances being 
planned. Hazard identification failures were fairly evenly split between improperly 
manned watches and the inadequate use of electronic equipment.  
The B/C-T MPF profile (figure 7) highlighted important latent and active pathway 
factors as training (27.4% and 45.2% respectively) and rules and policies (37.% and 
19.1% respectively). Further, aggregate scores showed pressures to be the third most 
highly rated MPF at 23.8%. 
 
Insert figure 7 about here. 
 
Collisions: Generalised Accident Scenario  
The above analysis can be integrated into a comprehensive generalised collision 
scenario (figure 8). B/C-T collisions arose from deficient watch keeping on both 
vessels. Necessary failures were the breaching of rules specifying safe watch keeping 
or passing distance, on either---or both---the trawler and bulk/cargo vessel 
respectively, in conjunction with deficient hazard identification on either or both 
vessels.  
Hazard identification failed either by entirely missing the presence of another vessel, 
or by misjudging its speed or heading. These in turn were both dependent on poor 
visibility at night, inexperience on the part of the watchman and the availability of 
poor or ambiguous information. The former is unavoidable, and was exacerbated by 
the later two factors. These had their roots in inadequate training and under-
specified rules regarding the level of experience required for watch duty and the level 
of information needed to base sound judgements on at night. Further, missed 
observations were also often due to distraction by competing tasks as a result of an 
under-manned watch. Misdiagnoses were additionally due to confirmation bias, 
which could have been remedied by improved training and raising crews’ awareness 
of this risk.  
Rules regarding adequate watch keeping were routinely violated on trawlers. These 
violations had their roots in under-manning, absent or incomplete procedures and 
cognitive bias. In turn, links could be traced from these to organizational pressures, 
rules and policies and training. Passing clearance regulations were regularly 
erroneously violated on bulk/cargo vessels by crew inexperienced at planning safe 
passing manoeuvres and who were open to cognitive bias. These precursors had their 
roots in training deficiencies and, again, under-specified rules regarding watchmen’s 
required level of experience.  
 
Insert figure 8 about here. 
 
Conclusion 
Accidents at sea are costly events, so it is important to extract as much value from 
them as possible. As indicated previously, learning from accidents is aided by 
generalising from them, in order to uncover common patterns of failure that are 
likely to recur in other situations. This research identified common causal patterns in 
groundings and collisions, spanning defensive failures, unsafe acts, cognitive and 
situational precursors and deeper organizational factors. These findings resonate 
with and extend the previous studies published on the human factor causes 
underlying these types of accidents, and highlight a range of implications and 
potential applications of this approach.  
The patterns identified by the research presented here were broadly in line with the 
key causes of groundings and collisions identified by previous studies [13, 14]. These 
studies predicted that groundings would often result from either a planning failure or 
a failure to properly identify or act on a deviation from a safe path, and that collisions 
would result from a failure to keep adequate watch. These immediate causes are 
relatively unsurprising and fit within the Generalised Accident Scenarios developed 
here. However, this research also identified supervision and team communication 
issues as an important contributing factor to groundings---likely due to the relatively 
fast-paced, collective and precise nature of the work needed to maintain a safe path 
in close-shore situations. Breakdowns in the sharing of information or in monitoring 
the activities of others could have immediate impacts in these circumstances. In 
contrast, the context in which collisions occurred typically involved only one person 
on each vessel on watch keeping and navigation duty.  
Breaking these causal factors down further, previous research [10] pointed to a range 
of causes that were explored further by the analyses presented here. These included 
inaccurate position finding and little use being made of navigation aids. This was a 
significant factor in both GAS presented here. Crew were often found to rely on their 
own judgement to determine passing clearances, even when they were inexperienced 
in this area. The inadequate use of navigation aids often implicated in groundings 
commonly related to poor position plotting, inadequate use of radar---or that the 
required charts were simply not available. Dealing with these issues requires  
addressing faults deeper in the organization, primarily involving the careful design 
and delivery of both training and the resources required for each job. Previous 
studies [9, 10] also suggested that communication on the bridge and bridge layout 
are often inadequate for the tasks being conducted. Issues relating to bridge layout 
were often involved in both types of accident. In particular, the location of the chart 
room typically took members of the team away from their stations---a frequent 
problem in collisions. Rather than simply a physical design failure, however, the 
findings here identify the human and organizational roots of this problem. An 
adequate watch and team communication can be maintained if, for instance, training 
ensures that position plotting can be conducted swiftly and accurately and Bridge 
Resource Management processes are used to maintain effective information sharing 
[19].  
More broadly, the findings presented here suggest that this structured approach to 
developing Generalised Accident Scenarios is useful for understanding and learning 
from past accidents. The value of the Generalised Accident Scenarios developed here 
lies in breaking down and specifying the human and organizational causal chains that 
typically lead to certain types of accidents. While the general scenarios may seem 
relatively complex and highlight many issues, in practice this translates into a wide 
range of opportunities to intervene in the development of accidents. This analysis 
suggests that breaking any one of these necessary error chains would forestall an 
accident. Modelling these causal patterns in detail provides crew, managers and 
policymakers a range of points at which to focus risk management action. Crew 
members could be trained to recognise and rapidly respond to the immediate failure 
modes and unsafe acts likely to cause an accident. Masters and company managers 
should be mindful of the precursors and organizational factors that can provoke 
those  unsafe acts. And policymakers ought to focus on developing regulations and 
standards that address failures throughout the whole of these accident scenarios. 
This potentially allows more comprehensive policy responses than those that may 
result from single events [22, 23].  
This approach, however, is not without its limitations. In terms of the analytical 
process, there is a degree of creativity and judgement required in constructing the 
causal patterns. Integrating the information from both analytical tools across many 
accidents requires time and some experience in accident analysis. The sort of analysis 
also requires a relatively high level of detailed information regarding individual 
accidents. It depends on prior detailed investigative work having been conducted into 
both the technical and human factors underlying accidents. This level of information 
is not always available. Further, it must be emphasised that the causal patterns 
produced do not represent deterministic and certain connections between causal 
factors. Rather, they highlight the most likely, logical and frequently observed 
interactions found within the set of accidents sampled. That is, a GAS provides a 
useful heuristic device, or rule-of-thumb, that helps to highlight key issues and direct 
attention, but does not claim to produce an objective and comprehensive accident 
model.  
Generalising from marine accidents presents many opportunities for future research 
and application. Extending the analysis to other accident types would be welcome, as 
would be further efforts to develop and refine the scenarios developed here, for 
instance by integrating findings from a wider range of accident investigations 
produced by other organizations. Moreover, these accident scenarios could function 
as ‘living documents’, with findings from new accidents integrated into them as they 
become available. In this way, policymakers could maintain a database of generalised 
accidents across each type, amending and developing them in light of new 
experiences. It would also be interesting to assess the benefits and practicalities of 
company managers applying this approach on their own unique set of risk events, 
potentially producing a highly actionable set of findings. Applied and developed in 
these ways, it is to be hoped that this approach to constructing Generalised Accident 
Scenarios may be able to move beyond simply explaining why ships sometimes don’t 
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